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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 11-3038 
______ 
 
GIOVANNA MARIBEL GUERRERO 
      Petitioner 
       
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 ______ 
 
On Petition from the Board of Immigration Appeals – Newark, NJ 
 (File No. A075-875-025) 
 
______ 
 
Argued February 14, 2013 
Before:  HARDIMAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges, and STARK, District Judge*
 
 
 
(Filed: March 11, 2013) 
 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
Thomas E. Moseley, Esq. (ARGUED) 
Suite 2600 
One Gateway Center 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
 
 
 
                                              
* The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, District Judge for the United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware, sitting by designation. 
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Sara J. Bergene, Esq. (ARGUED) 
Justin R. Markel, Esq. 
Stefanie N. Hennes, Esq.(ARGUED) 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
This petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
principally raises the question of whether a lawful permanent resident alien (LPR) who is 
convicted of attempting to bring another alien to the United States without prior 
authorization in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A)1 is therefore “inadmissible” to the 
United States as an alien smuggler under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i).2
                                              
1 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) provides that: “(2) Any person who, knowing or in reckless 
disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, 
enter, or reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United States in 
any manner whatsoever, such alien, regardless of any official action which may later be 
taken with respect to such alien shall, for each alien in respect to whom a violation of this 
paragraph occurs-- 
 
(A) be fined in accordance with Title 18 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both . . 
. .” 
2 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) provides that “[a]ny alien who at any time knowingly has 
encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter 
the United States in violation of law is inadmissible.” 
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We have jurisdiction over this petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Because the 
evidence of record is insufficient to support the BIA’s conclusion that the petitioner, 
Giovanna Maribel Guerrero, was “inadmissible,” we will reverse the decision of the BIA. 
I 
We write principally for the benefit of the parties and recite only the facts essential 
to our disposition. Guerrero is a native and citizen of Peru and a LPR of the United 
States. In April, 2005, after a short trip abroad Guerrero attempted to reenter the United 
States at Miami International Airport as a returning LPR. Guerrero was not admitted but 
was instead paroled into the United States for purposes of prosecution.  
A federal grand jury subsequently indicted Guerrero on five counts of “knowingly 
attempt[ing] to bring aliens to the United States . . . knowing and in reckless disregard of 
the fact that such aliens had not received prior official authorization to come to, enter and 
reside in the United States, regardless of any official action which might later be taken 
with respect to such aliens” in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A). Guerrero was also 
indicted on one count of knowingly providing a passport to someone other than the 
person to whom it was issued, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1544.3
                                              
3 18 U.S.C. § 1544 proscribes “willfully and knowingly furnish[ing], dispos[ing] of, or 
deliver[ing] a passport to any person, for use by another than the person for whose use it 
was originally issued and designed . . . .” 
 Guerrero pleaded guilty 
to one count of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A) and was sentenced to 18 months of 
probation. The remaining counts—including the sixth count concerning the provision of a 
passport—were dismissed. 
4 
 
 In July, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security charged Guerrero as a 
removable alien pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), which provides that “[a]ny alien 
who at any time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other 
alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law is inadmissible.” At 
the ensuing proceedings before the Immigration Court, Guerrero contended as a threshold 
matter that as a LPR she could not be deemed “inadmissible” and should, instead, be 
subject to removal proceedings.4 She further argued that the fact that she pleaded guilty 
to an offense under § 1324(a)(2)(A) is insufficient to prove the essential elements of § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i).5
The Immigration Judge found that Guerrero “engaged in illegal activity after 
having departed the United States,” thus rendering her an applicant for admission 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii).
  
6
                                              
4 The difference is significant. If she were not an applicant for admission, Guerrero, who 
had been admitted to the United States and had become a LPR, would be subject to 
removal only if she violated a statute so providing. She would also be entitled to 
constitutional due process protections, which apply to aliens already in the United States 
but not to applicants for admission. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
 The Immigration Judge further determined 
5 Guerrero also invoked two exceptions to removability not relevant to this appeal and 
applied for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). We need not 
address at length Guerrero’s claim that she is eligible for cancellation of removal. 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) establishes that aliens convicted of aggravated felonies are 
ineligible for cancellation of removal.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N) in turn specifically lists 
alien smuggling offenses under § 1324(a)(2) as aggravated felonies. Moreover, this Court 
has held that a conviction under § 1324(a)(2) constitutes an aggravated felony, 
notwithstanding that the offense is a misdemeanor under federal law. Biskupski v. 
Attorney General, 503 F.3d 274, 279-81 (3d Cir. 2007). 
6 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) provides: “An alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the 
United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien . . . (iii) has engaged 
in illegal activity after having departed the United States . . . .” 
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that Guerrero’s guilty plea provided substantial evidence to demonstrate that she 
knowingly assisted or aided undocumented aliens in trying to illegally enter the United 
States. The Immigration Judge therefore held that Guerrero was “inadmissible” and not 
eligible for cancellation of removal. 
 Guerrero appealed from the decision of the Immigration Judge to the BIA. The 
BIA, conducting de novo review, affirmed the Immigration Judge’s judgment in all 
respects. This timely petition for review followed. 
II 
We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo, subject to established principles 
of deference.  See Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).7
III 
 We will 
reverse the BIA’s ultimate “inadmissibility” decision only if it is “manifestly contrary to 
law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(C).  
We begin by addressing the question of whether the BIA properly treated Guerrero 
as an applicant for admission to the United States, despite her status as a LPR of this 
country. Generally an alien who is a LPR of the United States returning from abroad is 
not regarded as an applicant for admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C). A returning LPR 
                                              
7 Here, we are asked to review an unpublished decision by a single member of the BIA.  
“Although we routinely accord Chevron [U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)] deference to published decisions of the BIA, this 
Court has never announced the deference due an unpublished decision rendered by a 
single member of the BIA.” De Leon-Ochoa v. Attorney General of the United States, 
622 F.3d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). As in De Leon-Ochoa, because the 
parties have not briefed this issue and our level of deference is not dispositive, we do not 
address this question. 
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who “has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States,” however, is 
deemed to be an applicant for admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii). By virtue of her 
guilty plea to § 1324(a)(2)(A), Guerrero plainly falls within the scope of § 
1101(a)(13)(C)(iii), which proscribes an alien from engaging in illegal activity after 
leaving the United States. Hence Guerrero was properly treated as an applicant for 
admission into this country. See Matter of Guzman Martinez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 845, 846-
47 (BIA 2012). 
Guerrero contends that, notwithstanding the plain statutory language, her actions 
do not fall within the terms of § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii). We do not agree. Guerrero first 
argues that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii) should be read to encompass only crimes of moral 
turpitude and thus should not be triggered by § 1324(a)(2)(A). There is, however, no 
support in the statutory text for this qualification. Section 1101(a)(13)(C) provides 
separately for crimes of moral turpitude and other substantive offenses, see 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(13)(C)(v), and Guerrero offers no persuasive grounds for merging the provisions 
of § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) into § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii).  
Guerrero also contends that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii) should be read to apply only to 
crimes that began upon a permanent resident’s departure from the United States and not 
to illegal activity that began at some time after departure. This claim similarly finds no 
support in the statutory text. As we have observed, the statute refers simply to illegal 
activity conducted “after having departed the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(13)(C)(iii) (emphasis added).  
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Guerrero invokes Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), in support of her 
construction of § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii). Fleuti, which established the basic contours 
governing when a returning LPR will be treated as an applicant for admission, did 
consider the purpose of departure. Id. However, the operative statutory language, which 
was enacted over three decades after Fleuti was filed, plainly provides no support for 
Guerrero’s claim. 
Thus, as to Guerrero’s first claim, we will affirm the BIA’s holding that Guerrero 
was an applicant for admission to the United States and therefore could be held 
“inadmissible.” We turn next to the question of whether the BIA properly concluded that 
the evidence of record demonstrates her “inadmissibility” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i). 
IV 
In support of its conclusion that Guerrero is “inadmissible,” the BIA relied solely 
on its determination that “all of the conduct described in [8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A)] falls 
within the range of activity described under [§ 1182(a)(6)(E)(i)].”8
                                              
8 We note that the BIA’s decision incorrectly references 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) instead 
of § 1324(a)(2)(A) as the offense of conviction. We construe this as a scrivener’s error. 
 Thus, we must 
determine whether the BIA correctly concluded that Guerrero’s guilty plea to one count 
of an indictment charging that she “knowingly attempt[ed] to bring aliens to the United 
States . . . knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such aliens had not received 
prior official authorization to come to, enter and reside in the United States, regardless of 
any official action which might later be taken with respect to such aliens,” in violation of 
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8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(A), see Certified Admin. Record at 121 (emphasis added), is 
sufficient to demonstrate that she “knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, 
or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law,” 
rendering her “inadmissible” under § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (emphasis added).9
A critical textual distinction separates the statutes at issue. Section 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i) requires an alien to knowingly assist another alien to enter or attempt to 
enter the country in violation of the law. Section 1324(a)(2)(A), however, applies to an 
alien who brings another alien to the country “knowing or in reckless disregard of the 
fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside 
in the United States” (emphasis added). Thus § 1324(a)(2)(A), the statute to which 
Guerrero pleaded guilty, may be satisfied by an alien who does not actually know (but 
rather recklessly disregards) whether the alien being brought to the country is legally 
entitled to enter. We are therefore unable to determine whether Guerrero was convicted 
on the basis of knowing conduct, the only conduct which satisfies § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), or 
 
                                              
9 Guerrero contends that in reaching this conclusion the Immigration Judge relied on an 
improper standard of proof. The BIA, however, reviewed the Immigration Judge’s 
decision de novo and gave no indication that it deferred to the Immigration Judge’s 
decision. We therefore are reviewing only the BIA’s decision. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 
F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). The BIA opinion makes no reference to the standard of 
proof it employed, and all of the BIA’s conclusions disputed on appeal are legal 
determinations based on statutory construction.  
If the BIA’s legal conclusion is flawed, the matter must be remanded regardless of 
the standard employed. The parties have not sufficiently briefed, and we decline to 
resolve, the “open question of who then bears the burden of showing admissibility, or a 
lack of inadmissibility, once it has been determined that an alien is an applicant for 
admission.” Matter of Rivens, 25 I. & N. Dec. 623, 626 (BIA 2011).  
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merely reckless conduct, which does not.10
In light of the present record, which provides no evidence for determining that 
Guerrero knowingly assisted another alien to illegally enter the United States, we 
conclude that the BIA erred when it determined that Guerrero’s guilty plea to an offense 
under § 1324(a)(2)(A) was sufficient to demonstrate her “inadmissibility” pursuant to § 
1182(a)(6)(E)(i).  
 See In Re: Xiomara Esther Rodriguez-De 
Espinoza, A041 319 055 – San Diego, CA, 2008 WL 5025213, at *2 (BIA Oct. 28, 
2008). 
Because “an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which 
the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be 
sustained,” SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943), we will therefore reverse the 
decision of the BIA and remand the matter to the BIA for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  
 
                                              
10 Guerrero was indicted for attempting to bring aliens to the United States “knowing and 
in reckless disregard” of their lack of authorization to enter. Because the statute itself 
may be satisfied by either knowledge or recklessness, however, demonstration of either 
mens rea is adequate for conviction. United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 68 (3d 
Cir. 1978). See also Matter of Espinosa, 10 I. & N. Dec. 98 (BIA 1962). 
 
 
 
